Coalition formation is an important area of research in multi-agent systems. The large number of agents can make coalition formation become a complex process. The problem of dealing with large number of agents during coalition formation has received little attention in the literature. Previous studies assume that each coalition value is known a priori. This assumption is impractical in realworld settings. Furthermore, the problem of finding coalition values become intractable for even a relatively small number of agents. This work studies coalition formation among fully cooperative agents in linear production domain, where each coalition value is not known a priori. The common goal of the agents is to maximize the system's profit. We propose a distributed algorithm that allow agents to i) deliberate profitable coalitions, and ii) compute optimal coalition structure. We show that our algorithm outperforms exhaustive search when generating profitable coalitions, which can be used to achieve optimal coalition structure that yields the system's maximal profit.
INTRODUCTION
Coalition formation is an important area of research in multi-agent systems. It studies the process that leads to cooperation among agents. The process involves i) negotiation in order to exchange information among agents, and ii) deliberation in order to decide with which agents should they cooperate. Coalition formation research has its roots in cooperative game theory where the focus is on what coalitions would form and what the payoffs for agents are. On the other hand, researchers in multi-agent systems are concerned with the complexity of coalition formation and in particular, settings where the number of agents involved is very large. The large number of agents can make coalition formation become a complex process, i.e., there is a large number of messages sent across while negotiating and there is a large number of possible coalitions to be considered while deliberating.
The problem of dealing with large number of agents during coalition formation has received little attention in the literature. A small of number of studies have considered the complexity of deliberation (Sandholm et al., 1999) . These studies, as in game theory, assume that a coalition value is associated with each coalition. Then they focus on how the optimal coalition structure can be achieved in a timely fashion. The complexity of finding coalition structure using thourough search is exponetial time (Sandholm et al., 1999) .
On the other hand, this work considers coalition formation where coalition values are not known a priori. This kind of setting is common in real world environment. Examples include internal/external collaboration in third party logistics providers, cooperation among nodes in grid computing and cooperation among service providers in composite web service environment. These real world scenarios make coalition formation highly complex because agents have to i)compute coalition values, and ii) compute the optimal coalition structure. Given m agents in a coalition formation process, the number of possible coalitions is 2 m , which is also the number of coalition values to be computed. The process of computing coalition values is complex, as is the process of deliberation. The problem becomes intractable even for a relatively small values of m.
Our goal in this research is to deal with this complexity. We modify Owen's linear production game where agents have to agree to pool their resources together in order to produce goods. The original work assumes a superadditive environment, where agents can simply form the grand coalition. Such an assumption is impractical in the real world. Since the cost of cooperation has to be taken into account while negotiating to form coalitions.
The outline of this paper is as follows. We introduce our setting. We describe how our algorithm works and discuss both in deliberating and forming coalitions. Then we discuss about the experiment and show empirical results. We discuss related work which followed by conclusion and future work.
COALITION FRAMEWORK

Linear Production Domain
Linear production games (Owen, 1975) are those in which agents are given resources and try to pool resources to produce goods in order to maximize the system's profit. Owen (Owen, 1975 ) studied linear production games in superadditive environment. Here, we consider linear production games in nonsuperadditive environments. We are given a set of agents, A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m }, whose goals are to maximize the system's profit. We are also given a set of resources R = {r 1 , r 2 . . . , r n } and a set of goods
Resources themselves are not valuable but they can be used to produce goods, which are valuable to agents. Let L = [α ij ] n×o , where α ij ∈ Z + , be the matrix that specifies the units of each resource r i ∈ R required to produce a unit of the good g j ∈ G. Such a matrix is called a linear technology matrix (Owen, 1975) . The price of each unit of goods produced is specified by the vec-
. In this setting, some agents would have the incentive to cooperate, e.g., if they cannot produce a certain good using only the resources at their disposal. Hence agents have to cooperate, i.e. form coalitions, in order to create value from their resources. Let S ⊆ A be a coalition. It will have a total of b
of the i th resource. The members of coalition S can use all these resources to produce any vector x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x o of goods that satisfies the following constraints:
We assume that agents have to pool their resources together at a coalition member's location to produce these goods. Thus agents' cooperation incurs some costs, e.g., transportation cost, etc. The cooperation cost among agents is specified by the matrix C = [c kl ] m×m , which assigns a cooperation cost between each pair (a k , a l ) of agents such that
We assume that all of the resources of agents are pooled at one location, which can be the location of any agent in the coalition. A singleton coalition yields cooperation cost of 0. For a coalition of size two, S = {a 1 , a 2 }, pooling coalition resources at any of the two sites yield the same cost for the coalition (i.e. the cooperation cost matrix is symmetric). The total cost for cooperation incurred by a coalition will be taken to be the sum of the pairwise cooperation costs between the agent at whose location coalition resources are pooled, and the other members of coalition. For a coalition of size three or larger, there is at least one agent, a k , such that
c ll for all a l ∈ S. We shall call a coalition member a k who yields the minimal cooperation cost for the coalition a coalition center.
Agents in the coalition S have to find a vector x to maximize the revenue accruing to a coalition. Let P S = o l=1 p l x l be the maximal revenue the coalition can generate. Let C S = l∈S c kl be the minimal cooperation cost for the coalition (obtained by selecting the optimal coalition center). Obviously, the ultimate objective of agents in the coalition is to maximize profit, i.e., the coalition value υ S , where
The linear inequalities referred to above, together with this objective function constitutes a linear programming problem. We shall call the solution, the vector x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x o that represents the optimal quantities of goods g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g o optimal product mix.
Optimal Coalition Structure
Coalition formation problems can also be considered as a set partitioning problem. The set of all agents will be partitioned into mutually disjoint and proper subsets. Each instance of a partition is known as a coalition structure(CS) (Dang and Jennings, 2004; Sandholm et al., 1999; Kahan and Rapoport, 1984) , while each subset is known as a coalition S. The value of each coalition structure
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indicates the system' utility yielded by that partitioning. The goal of cooperative agents in coalition formation (Sandholm et al., 1999; Dang and Jennings, 2004) is to maximize the system's utility.
Computing the optimal coalition structure in a nonsuperadditive environment is non-trivial (Sandholm et al., 1999) . Previous studies (Sandholm et al., 1999; Dang and Jennings, 2004) assumed the existence of a characteristic function and considered algorithms for computing the optiamal coalition structure. Such an assumption is impractical in the real world-each coalition value may not be known a priori. Thus agents have to compute all coalition values first. Given a set of m agents, there are 2 m possible subsets, hence the complexity of computing all coalition structures is substantially worse.
Here, we consider a distributed algorithm that allows agents to compute coalition values and approach the optimal coalition structure as they proceed. Each agent has to do to two tasks: i) Delibarating: deliberate over what coalitions it might form by incrementally improving the initial set of coalitions, and ii) Forming coalitions: exchange information to form coalitions such that those coalitions yield maximal profit to the system. The sets of such coalitions are the optimal coalition structures. The main goal of the algorithm is to reduce search space for finding the optimal coalition structure. This can be achieved by reducing the number of coalitions to be considered. In our setting, the optimal coalition structure must yeild a profit, a non-nagative utility, to the system. In the worst case, the system's profit is 0-each agent is a singleton coalition and cannot produce anything at all.
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR COALITION FORMATION
Deliberating Process
In the following, we will indentify a coalition by the indentifier of its coalition centre agent. Thus the coalition S k will have agent a k as its centre. Hence b S represents the resource vector of S k . The reasoning described below is conducted by the coalition centre agent for each coalition. Given a coalition S k , let G k refer to the set of goods whose resource requirements are fully or partially satsified by b S , the resources available in S k (excluding goods whose resource requirement might be trivially satisfied because these are 0). For each good g j ∈ G k , the coalition centre agent a k ranks agents not currently in its coalition on a per good basis. For each resource r i of good g j , agent a k ranks non-member agents by computing for each a l / ∈ S k , whose b
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Figure 1: Agents are ranked by their potential profit per each resource of a good.
portional contribution to the profit of the good (using its fraction of the resource requirements for that good provided by the a l ) minus the (pair-wise) collaboration cost between a l and a k , i.e.,
The agent a k uses this proportional contribution π j i to construct a binary tree for each g j . Figure 1 illustrates the tree T j of g j . The only child of the root g j is the first resource α 1j , whose left child is the second resource α 2j , and so on. The agent a k uses the indicative vector β j to help collecting additional coalition members into its coalition. If the agent a k wants to produce an additional unit of g j , it identifies the resource that is needed the most, β end for identify the most needed resource r i * end while return S So far, the agent a k knows that if it wants to produce at least an additional unit of g j , it needs to add agents from S into its S k . The agent a k create a trial coalition by merging S into S. Since each new agent may posses other resources not required for producing g j , the trial coalitions may find a better solution for producing goods. Hence the profits υ of trial coalitions vary. The additional agents S * are those S that provide the highest additional profit υ * and are kept as the basis for further growing coalition, S * . The subalgorithm for selecting the most profitable members is shown in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Select the most profitable members
Require: A coalition S Require: ranking trees T G set highest profit υ * = 0 set most profitable members S * = null for all g j ∈ G do if S is not capable of producing g j then continue end if get additional agents S set trial coalition S j = S ∪ S j compute trial coalition's profit υ S j if υ S j > υ S * then set S * = S j end if end for return S * At the begining of deliberating, the agent a k considers itself a singleton coalition. It create the ranking tree T G of all agent for each good. Then it keeps adding the most profitable agents, S * , into the coalition. This will keep the coalition's marginal profit grows while the size of the coalition is growing. It also reduces the number of coalitions each agent a k has to maintain. The new coalition S will be added to a list L + of profitable coalitions. This process repeats until there are no more agents left or it cannot find any more profitable agents. The main algorithm is shown in algorithm 3.
G for all goods select the most profitable members S * while A = ∅ and 
Coalition Formation Algorithm
Once each agent finishes its deliberation, it ranks all of its coalitions by profit. Let S − be a non-profitable coalition, whose value υ S − ≤ 0. and S + be a profitable coalition, whose value υ S + > 0.
Lemma 1 Any S
− coalition can be replaced by a set of its members' singleton coalitions, whose υ a k∈S ≥ 0, such that the coalition structure's value will not be decreased.
Therefore, all non-profitable coalitions can be ignored. Each agent will prune all of the non-profitable coalitions, if there is any. The remaining coalitions are profitable. In fact, our algorithm in deliberation process can simply prevent this happening using its tree T G . It always generate profitable coalitions. Obviously, each singleton coalition is non-negative. Hence, non-profitable coalitions must not exist in the coalition structure. Given that the deliberation algorithm generates all profitable coalitions among agents inclusively, agents can i) exchange information about coalitions generated and their singleton coalitions, and ii) decide form coalitions that yield the optimal coalition structure value.
Proposition 1
The optimal coalition structure can be constructed by profitable coalitions generated by agents and their singleton coalitions.
Next step each agent sends information about coalitions it has generated to each other. For each coalition size, each agent can further reduce the number of coalitions it has by deleting non-centred coalitions and those whose values are non-maximal. Up to this point, the remaining coalitions are likely to be in the coalition structure. Agents exchange information again and compute optimal coalition structure using existing algorithm, e.g., (Sandholm et al., 1999) . The algorithm is shown below.
1. Each agent a k deletes non-profitable coalitions from its list 2. Agent a k sends its list of profitable coalitions to each coalition member 3. For each coalition size, agent a k deletes all coalitions that their centre are not the agent itself and those that do not yield the maximal value 4. Each agent sends the remaining coalitions to each member 5. Each agent compute the optimal coalition structure using existing algorithm ( (Sandholm et al., 1999)) 6. The optimal coalition structure will be recognized by agents.
EXPERIMENT
We conduct experiment of our algorithm within a range of 10 − 100 agents. In each round, the agents number increases by 5. The number of goods and resources are equal and increase by 1 in every 2 rounds. In each round, the technology matrix, agents' resources and cooperation costs among agents are randomly generated with uniform distribution. The number of each resource α ij in the technology matrix is in the range 0 − 10. The prices of the goods are in the range of 10 − 20 while the cooperation costs are in the range of 0 and the number of agents in that round, e.g., 10, 15, . . .. As our algorithm deals with non-superadditive environments, this setting tends to increase the cooperation cost of a coalition as its size grows. Hence it forces agents to work harder to form profitable coalitions and to achieve optimal coalition structure. Both algorithms uses the Simplex algorithm to find the optimal solution for each coalitions. The revenue generated is subtracted to achieve the coalition's profit. The Table 1 compares the average deliberation time agents spent using exhaustive search and that using our algorithm. The time is measured in milliseconds. We experienced that exhaustive search hardly make progress after the number of coalitions generated exceeded 2.5 millions. As shown in the table, the time spent on deliberation using exhaustive search was approximately doubled as the number of agents increased by 1. With 20 agents, the time spent on deliberation using exhaustive search is far larger than that using our algorithm. Our computer system could not carry on simulations any further after we reached 35 agents using exhaustive search. We continued experiment using our algorithm until the number of agents reached 100. (Although we carried on the experiment up to 300 agents, the results are not shown here.) Since the number of coalitions generated are small, the optimal coalition structure can be found more rapidly.
Having pruned a large number coalitions, the number of remaining coalitions are small. Hence the number of coalition structures are small. Applying existing algorithm can intuitively achieve optimal coalition structure in timely fashion.
RELATED WORK
Shehory et. al (Shehory and Kraus, 1995) propose an algorithm to allocate tasks to agents in distributed problem solving manner, i.e., agents try to maximise the utility of the system. They consider a domain where a task composed of multiple subtasks, each of which requires specific capacity. These tasks have to be carried out by agents who have specific capacities to carry out tasks. Each agent prepares its list of candidate coalitions and proposes to other agents.
Shehory et. al. (Shehory and Kraus, 1996 ) study overlapping coalition formation in distributed problem solving systems in non-superadditive environments. Althhough agents can belong to multiple coalitions at the same time, agents execute one task at a time. The task allocation process is completed prior to the execution of the tasks. Agents are grouprational, i.e., they form coalition to increase the system's payoff. Sandholm et. al. (Sandholm and Lesser, 1995) analyze coalition formation among self-interested agents who are bounded-rational. They consider deliberation cost in terms of monetary cost. The agents' payoffs are directly affected by deliberation cost. In their work, agents agree to form coalition and each of the agents can plan to acheive their goals.
Soh et. al. (Soh and Tsatsoulis, 2002) propose an integrated learning approach to form coalition in real time, given dynamic and uncertain environments. This work concentrates on finding out potential coalition members by utilising learning approach in order to quickly form coalitions of acceptable quality (but possibly sub-optimal.) Sandholm et. al. (Sandholm et al., 1999 ) study the problem of generating coalition structure generation. Since the number of coalition structure can be very large for exhaustive search, they argue whether the optimal coalition structure found via a partial search can be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum. They propose an anytime algorithm that estiblishes a tight bound withing a minimal amount of search.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Coalition formation is an important area of research in multi-agent system. The problem of generating optimal coalition structure, the partitioning of a set of agents such that the sum of all coalitions' values within the partitioning is maximal, is an important issue in the area. The small number of existing studies assume each coalition value is known a priori. Such assumption is impractical in realworld settings. Furthermore, finding all coalition values becomes intractable for a relatively small number of agents. We study coalition formation among fully cooperative agents where each coalition value is not known a priori. We proposes a distributed algorithm to generate optimal coalition structure by reducing the number of coalitions to be involved. Since they do not help increasing coalition structures' values, the nonprofitable coalitions are not generated by the deliberation algorithm. If there is any, each agent delete them first. Then the information of remaining coalitions will be exchanged among agent. For each coalition size, each agent prunes its list of coalitions again deleting those, whose centres are not the agent itself and those whose values are not maximal within their coalition sizes. Remaining coalitions will be exchanged among agents again. Lastly, each agent uses existing algorithm (Sandholm et al., 1999) to compute optimal coalition structure.
Although this algorithm helps reducing number of coalitions involved in generating optimal coalition structure, there is always rooms to improve. We want to further reduce the number of coalitions generated by each agent and want to make sure that coalitions generated are highly likely to be in the coalition structure. Furthermore, we want to improve the coalition algorithm rathan using existing one.
